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Exile Government in the Armenian Polity 
Khachig Tololyan 
Wesleyan University 
Overall Claims and Theoretical Implications 
Exile is nearly as old as human polity, but the conce pt of 
a government-in-exile is a modem invention. a product of the 
period in which the nation-state became dominant. During this 
era. Armenians had a nation-state for only two and one half 
years, from May 28, 1918 to December 2. 1920. This stu dy will 
deal with the fate of that slate's government after 1l was dep osed 
by the Red Anny, which reconquered the briefly indepen dent 
former provinces of the Tzarist Empire in the Transcaucas us . 
But the usefulness of the Armenian case to a more gene ral 
investigation of the topic of exile governments is not limite d to 
this instance ; indeed . the example cannot be understoo d , and, 
more importantly. its potential relevance to a needed revis ion of 
our theories concerning governments -in-exile cannot be ful-
filled. without a more extended consideration of Arme nian 
political culture in exile . This diasporan polity was and is highly 
organized. maintains contacts with the population living in the 
home territories. and over the centuries has developed a govern-
ment of exiles and by exiles that envisages itself as respo nsible 
for and leading the entire nation . Of course. there is always an 
element of wishful thinking in the claims of exiles; neverthe less. 
the tenacity and resilience of lhe evolvingAnnenian govern ments 
Qf exile is rarely equalled in the history of diasporas. In the 
perspective provided by the long trajectory of Armenian exile, the 
government-in-exile of 1921-1924 is a brief though signifi cant 
episode . Considered in broader context, the Armenian case 
raises questions about our definitions of the core categ ories 
"government" and "exile". 
The Armenian example illustrates the limitati on s of 
focusing on the formal diplomatic recognition extende d lo a 
government-in-exile as lhe sole or even primary index of its 
legitimacy and importance, and especially of doing so at the 
expense of the socio-cultural roots of political phenomena . Such 
a narrow formalism obscures other factors that are equa lly vilal 
to the meaningful survival of exile governments . The form alist 
and statist analysis arrives at conclusions that are alrea dy built 
into the assumptions of the powers that create government s-in-
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exile, namely, that they will survive so long as they serve the 
mterests of their patrons; they are "cards, not players," in the 
words of an anonymous British diplomat'. Indeed, the Armenian 
government-in-exile ceased to exist when tacit recognition of its 
status by the Western powers lapsed after they signed the Treaty 
of Lausanne in 1923. But its disappearance was not crucial. It 
was assimilated into the long-familiar government of exile, and 
its leaders joined the cadres of political institutions already in 
place . 
With the possible exception of traditional despotic re-
gimes. governments perform services for civil society in order to 
sustain their legitimacy. Governments-in-exile are often an 
exception : their survival and success can depend on the efficacy 
with which they serve the foreign policy interests of the major 
powers that are their patrons. In contrast, the survival and 
success of a government of exiles like the Armenian depends on 
the services it performs for its co-nationals in exile - and 
sometimes even for those under rival regimes at home. It requires 
no patron-state. Indeed, it flourishes in an absence of state 
concern, which is why it attained its peak under the weak 
governments of "confessional" Lebanon between 1945 and 1975. 
It does require its host's tolerance of its existence; where the 
centralized state is intent on providing every service and rejecting 
the claim of non-state institutions to do the same, as in France, 
even a prosperous community like the Franco-Armenian does 
not develop a strong "branch" of transnational, diasporan exile 
government. 
During much of its history, the Armenian government of 
exiles extended far more services to its co-nationals than most 
diplomatically recognized governments-in-exile tried to or suc-
ceeded in providing. Lacking the resources. traditions. institu-
tions. cadres and will. such governments-in-exile (those of the 
Baltic Republics. or Poland. or Norway, during World War II, say, 
or Spain's after Franco's victory) have performed few services for 
the exile population they worked with; even when they endure for 
decades, as the Baltic ones did, they have not sunk into the exile 
community the political roots that services of certain kinds 
engender, whereas in certain times and places Armenian govern-
ments of exile performed for their co-nationals functions we 
associate with local provincial governments, at times even with 
a state . 
In addition, and in compensation for its inability to effect 
a transition towards sovereignty, the Armenian government of 
exiles has done considerable work of political organization and 
cultural production, of the sort which preserves, invigorates and 
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invents the concepts. narratives and symbols that empower 
exiles to live on as a collectivity, or at least to represent their 
situation as such to themselves and others . Direct or indirect 
participation in cultural production is part of the task of the 
political class in any polity, national or other. Analyses of the 
sources of the legitimacy of all governments. at home or in exile 
must look not only at their continuity with previous regimes but 
also at the way in which they influence both material and cultural 
production. The nature of such production. as well as the 
resources devoted to it, differs greatly in the cases of exile and 
sovereign governments, but there is nevertheless an overlap 
rather than a radical chasm between the two, as the Annenlan 
case shows. 
In what ls easily the best. as well as the most up-to-date 
book on political exile, Yossl Shain clarifies the issues. He 
identifies two urgent concerns that affect all polities in exile and 
shape their behavior: "loyaltyM and "recognitlonM•. "LoyaltyM here 
refers to more than verbal expressions of adherence. First. the 
term underscores the exile groups' need to define varieties of 
"loyalM behavior: It also emphasizes the problems of extracting 
constant manifestations ofloyalty from co-nationals in exile and 
at home, where they are ruled by the regime the exiles oppose. 
The gravity of the latter problem is accentuated, first, by the fact 
that co-nationals usually have the option of offering the same 
behavior (their "loyaltyM) as testimony to the legitimacy of the 
ruling regime ; secondly, they can usually do the latter at less 
potential cost and with the hope of greater reward, since even 
illegitimate regimes in power have greater resources with which 
to reward or punish. 
Shain's second term, "recognitlon.M refers to the interna-
tional dimension of exile, to the fact that all operations of an exile 
group or government depend, at a minimum, on receiving refuge 
in a host country and permission to operate in as well as from it. 
Of course, under optimal conditions, host/patron countries 
extend various levels of diplomatic and material support, up to 
and including recognition of a group as a government-in-exile. 
Sometimes. recognition can have barely perceptible results for 
decades. as when the U.S. continued to "supportM the govern-
ments-in-exile of the Baltic republics seized by Stalin's armies. 
American refusal to legitimize that annexation seemed an insig-
nificant epiphenomenon of the Cold War, but in the Gorbachev 
era the inventiveness and daring of nationalist movements in 
precisely these republics results in some part from that refusal. 
The population of these regions withheld the full measure of 
legitimating loyalty to the Soviet state in part because it was 
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encouraged by the continued if symbolic life of governments-in-
exf}e, reminders of the lost past and possible future of such 
"captive" nations. 
The Armenians, who have been equally restive in the 
Gorbachev era, have not had a comparable Western-recognized 
government-in-exile to call upon, save briefly and ln unusual 
circumstances between 1921 and 1924. Instead, alternately 
cooperating and competing elites have worked through several 
institutions as a government of exiles, plausibly claiming that 
they represent the authentic interests and aspirations of the 
",Armenian Nation." This nation has not been coextensive with a 
sovereign nation-state, and half or more of its member have lived 
in exile for centuries. Yet it has claimed the loyalty of the majority 
of Armenians for more than a century, and of a plurality for even 
longer. 3 Such loyalty has manifested itself in a double sphere of 
operation: international, as when Armenians sent people they 
considered representatives of national interests to great-power 
conferences; but also intranational and intra-state, as when the 
Sultans of the multi-ethnic Ottoman empire received at Court 
legitimate Armenian representatives acknowledged as such by 
their subjects. 
When a government acquires legitimacy in democratic 
elections and is then expelled by brute force (e.g. by Nazi 
conquest), it carries this legitimacy with it. The legitimacy of a 
government of exiles cannot equal this; therefore, this study runs 
the risk of being perceived as a celebration of an implausible 
legitimacy in exile. But to assert the longevity of the phenomenon 
is not necessarily to claim that these governments of exile always 
enjoyed the support of a majority, either in the homeland or in the 
diaspora. The extent of such support is always notoriously 
difficult to determine: the Allies found it hard to estimate in the 
case of de Gaulle's "government" before 1943, say. In the 
Armenian case, over centuries, in different diasporan locations. 
under the rule of various kinds of states. ethnic and civic loyalties 
fluctuated. The number of militant cadres has risen and fallen, 
as has the number of those who have been actively supportive, 
passively affiliated. or indifferently oriented away from ex.ilic and 
ethnic politics and towards assimilation in the host society. 
Nevertheless, the recognition and loyalty offered to the Armenian 
exile governments was/is remarkable. whether assessed in 
terms of duration, self-imposed fiscal levies. degree of commit-
ment of volunteer labor and time, or in some cases the sacrifice 
of life itself. This loyalty did not materialize as a spontaneous 
outgrowth of national feeling, though Armenian historians are 
occasionally guilty of the romantic assumption that its growth 
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was inevitable. Rather, the development of loyalty to a national 
ideal and leadership was the result of successful efforts by exile 
organizations to do the ideological and communal work that 
renews the commitment of diasporan generations. The forging of 
a national consensus in a transnational context is one of several 
features of Armenian political history that makes it an unusual 
case for students of exile governments. 
This paper proposes that the case of the Armenian polity 
requires that we retheortze governments-in-exile, and indeed the 
range of meanings given to "government" itself. It will present its 
argument historically. through an account of the way in which 
a communal Armenian administration of minor notables eventu-
ally came to speak in the name of collective interests. then 
established and led quasi-governmental coalitions in exile as 
well as at home. all the while contending with internal challeng-
ers who, ironically. briefly came to power as leaders of a sovereign 
state. This history reverses the normal trajectory, which moves 
from nation-formation to nation-state. national government and 
government-in-exile. In fact. the long development of quasi-
governmental institutions in exilic enclaves• and at home pre-
ceded or was coextensive with the shaping of the Armenian 
nation, which in tum created the nation-state of 1918-1920. 
This variant of the dominant paradigm points to the limits of our 
current, statist conceptions of governments-in-exile. A less 
formalist approach to such governments enables us to encom-
pass under the "Armenian model" comparable - though not 
identical - attempts at nation-making by quasi-governmental 
exile elites within or beyond the borders of other multi-ethnic 
states: Eritreans in Ethiopia or Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, 
for example. 
The Governments of Exile Before the Government-in-Exil e 
(1375-1921) 
When the last Armenian Kingdom. the Cilician, suc-
cumbed to the Mameluk armies in 1375, its King, Levon V. 
traveled to the courts of Europe as an exile government of one. 
failed to obtain assistance. and died there. The triple division of 
the Armenians, which persists to this day, had already begun to 
develop. Many remained in the homeland which, like Poland, was 
partitioned among two and then three empires: Persian, Otto-
man and (after 1828) Russian. Others lived in "intrastate diaspo-
ras," that is, in exile communities outside the home territories 
but still within the boundaries of the three multi-ethnic empires 
that also ruled the homeland. Finally. there were exiles who 
formed diasporas in the West and Asia (e.g. India). While they 
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were few, they were important because they included many 
educated. prosperous and militant Armenians. 
From 1375 to 1639. traditional Armenia was (badly) ruled 
by conquerors: emigration and the size of the Armenian diaspora 
increased steadily. The sense of belonging to a two thousand year 
old culture receded in all areas of life except the religious. 
Linguistic unity declined•. The aristocracy, which had survived 
previous periods of foreign rule, was nearly exterminated. Ves-
uges of a local leadership consisting of some merchants and of 
landowners remained. but declined: monasteries also declined 
in prosperity and learning•. 
Under these conditions of attenuated collective identity, 
it was difTicult to develop a political elite. The chief Armenian 
notables were clergymen or wealtny members of the "merchant-
diaspora "1who gathered around the Church. which was the only 
institution in Armenian life recognized by all and in touch with 
all: if the Armenians were a "nation" at all. an azk. it was because 
such an institution focused their collective activity and identity. 
Significantly. azkis the word which came to mean "nation" later: 
during this period it meant "folk" or "people" or. at best. "ethno-
naUon." 
As the chief administrative. juridical and representative 
agency of this people, the Church had considerable power. After 
the Fifteenth century. the Ottoman Empire ruled its non-Muslim 
subjects by a system of millet-s. religious groupings whose 
members reported to the Sultan through a clerical hierarchy. The 
Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul spoke for, therefore "repre-
sented," the Empire's Armenians. both those in the Ottoman-
occupied homeland and in the intra-state diaspora. The Patri-
archate administered properties, had its own court and was 
empowered to judge a range of cases: it even had a prison and 
imposed certain punishments. Clerics and some lay administra-
tors together were the nucleus of what would become the exile 
leadership. It is worth reiterating that the Ottoman system did 
not simply consist of a "Turkish" national dynasty ruling other 
"nations" like the Greek or Armenian; rather, it was a multi-
ethnic and multi-denominational tributary empire in which the 
Armenians in intrastate exile developed an infra-structure of 
communal government that was put into place at the insistence 
of the rulerse. In the Persian Empire, where there was no millet 
system, wealthy merchants were prominent earlier. but always 
acted around the symbolic center of the Church, with clerics as 
at least nominal leaders. Here, too, Islam recognized religious 
communities. not nations. 
After 1639. centralized authority weakened in both the 
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Ottoman and Persian Empires. Individual adventurers and 
visionaries. then coalitions of elites claiming to speak for the 
Armenian people, began to seek recognition from the European 
powers, whom they approached in futile attempts to gain protec-
tion and even to create an autonomous political entity. These 
failures were followed by David Beg's rebellion of the l 720's in the 
Syunik and Karabagh regions (precisely those regions which are 
in the news today for causing massive demonstrations in the 
Armenian SSR}. This rebellion began when Armenian notables, 
whose quasi-feudal privileges were threatened by Muslim over-
lords, sent emissaries to the exiles who had settled in the 
independent Kingdom of Georgia, to the north . They persuaded 
one David Beg to form and head a government begun in exile 
rather than a government expelled to exile. A descendant of the 
minor Armenian nobility, David Beg was a skilled officer of the 
Georgian Army and seems to have had its tacit support, perhaps 
in trade for a weakened Persia. He surprised the notables by 
sustaining the rebellion for a decade, in the course of which he 
punished, sometimes by execution, the petty lords who resisted 
him . They wanted an impartial exile not implicated in local 
conflicts: they got that. but also a leader whose vision of Armenia, 
not shaped by local interests. was "national" in the modem 
sense . Exiles and others removed from distracting local disputes 
are often the first to envisage a nation•. 
David Beg's rebellion showed that leaders from the 
homeland and the diaspora could work together; Armenians 
could be trained in exile and return to lead military formations. 
His successes and failures provided the raw material for both 
literary and popular narratives of resistance and nation-forma-
tion ; such narratives play a central role in the formation of 
Armenian political culture, with effects that remain demon-
strable down to modem Armenian terrorism •• and the Karabagh 
movement in Soviet Armenta . 
After the rebellion. from the l 740's to 1914, Armenians 
working in the intrastate and overseas diasporas did the ideologi-
cal and organizational work that fashioned their collectivity as a 
transnational nation. that is as an entity that saw itself as a 
nation. but existed without a state and across the boundaries of 
Empires. This polity was endowed with a vital culture and a high 
degree of internal. communal organization; elites struggled for 
the control of its institutions and contested each other's claim to 
represent the renascent nation in the eyes of its three imperial 
rulers or in the courts of the European powers. These quasi-
governments were possessed of two features essential to author-
ity and legitimacy: they had continuity (the Patriarchate dated 
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from 1461) and they were the providers of a remarkably large 
range of services, especially in the Ottoman Armenian diaspora. 
Such developments did not result from a plan or blue-
prtnt: they evolved in piecemeal fashion. Elites acted to meet 
specific needs that declining and supremely indifferent empires 
had no mechanisms which to attend. Such is the cunning of 
history that those communal institutions which succeeded in 
meeting these needs found that to do so was to be acknowledged 
in quasi-governmental terms they had not sought, especially in 
the Ottoman context, where for the leaders of a Christian millet 
to be perceived as overtly political was literally to court death. A 
cynical- or, depending upon one's temperament. a realistic -
assessment of elites that work to meet communal needs may 
conclude that all such work is a prelude to power-seeking. But 
in the situation of the diasportzed Armenian nation, the original 
moU~es of the elites were far less ambitious. far more local and 
contingent. Yet their successors found they had come to fulfill 
more functions than governments-in-exile do. and to receive the 
loyalty and recognition due to the same. 
The Armenian elites attained quasi-governmental status 
because, first in the intrastate diaspora and then in the home-
land, they came to assume responsibility for neglected services. 
The Church and its clergy, which functioned as a uniformed 
bureaucracy offering an uninterrupted link to the Armenian 
past, was omnipresent. though its authority slowly declined 
under the impact of secularism. Within the Ottoman Empire, the 
wealthy amiras (Armenians who had acquired wealth and status 
as tax-farmers, financiers, industrialists and government ap-
pointees) struggled with the developing bourgeoisie of profes-
sionals and smaller businessmen for control of the millet'_s 
administrative machinery, which became steadily more impor-
tant as the elites competed to endow schools. charitable founda-
tions. hospitals and cultural organizations. Within these institu-
tions, a culture-rich and cash-poor "class" of petty intelligentsia 
developed as a cadre. Aft.er 1789, but. above all after 1848, this 
cadre helped to articulate a national idea and created a national 
written language (1840-1870) which, without benefit of state 
machinery, became the unifying language of the Armenians in a 
fashion that has no exact parallels in pre-state format.ions• 1• The 
revival of Gaelic in Ireland and Hebrew in Palestine and Israel are 
not directly comparable, because of differences in circumstance, 
and the former. at least. is a failure compared to the success of 
modern Armenian 12. It is no accident that this success took place 
in an Ottoman Empire unwilling and unable to educate even its 
Muslim subjects. let alone the Christians. This and other respon-
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sibilities were left to a communal leadership, with th e sta te only 
half-aware that to cede them to ethnonatlonal elites is to endow 
them with a quasi-governmental legitimacy. should the y prove 
successful. 
In the Ottoman Armenian diaspora. and then increas-
ingly in the homeland. the Armenian leadership was extr aordi-
narily successful. There was one school for this entire pop ulation 
in 1 790: in 1889 there were 540 elementary schools for the 
approximately 2 million Armenian subjects of the Empire, or one 
per 3700 inhabitants, a strikingly high figure for that time and 
place' 3 • Exact figures are not available. but it is clear that at this 
stage, with their Churches. schools and surprisingly large nu mber 
of small and ephemeral newspapers. the Armenians had a petty 
intelligentsia of clerics and laymen that numbered in the several 
thousand and a linked petty leadership of several thousan d more 
- businessmen. professionals. village chiefs who made u p the 
political leadership of the home territories and intrastate exile. A 
comparable network existed in the Tzarist empire. on a smaller 
scale within the homeland but on an equally large sca le in the 
intrastate diaspora, particularly in Thilisi, Georgia's capita l. the 
majority of whose population was Armenian, and which was the 
indisputable intellectual center of the Armenians in the Ru ssian 
empire. There and in the Ottoman empire, the intrastate exile 
elites dominated the home populations. 
Until 1887, the elites had little regular contact ac ross the 
boundaries of the hostile Ottoman and Tzarist empires. Then 
transnational political parties were founded: first among stu-
dents in Geneva and emigrants in Marseilles: then among 
students at Russian universities. influenced by revoluti onary 
socialism: and lastly in the home territories. Two impo rt ant 
parties. the Hnchag and the Dashnag, were founded in 1887 and 
1890; the former was more inclined to doctrinaire socialism: both 
were deeply nationalist. They were later joined in the political 
arena by more narrowly bourgeois, socialist, and comm unist 
factions. Their existence made more explicit the competiti on for 
the loyalty of the Armenian nation. Severe divisions arose. but 
the very fact of competition by political parties undersco res the 
governing if not quite governmental role of the comm unity 
structures for whose control (or against which) they strugg led. 
This became all the more true as that function of government 
which includes dying and killing for the nation was undert aken 
by the Hnchags and Dashnags, who organized self-de fense 
groups in the homeland villages and terrorist activity in the 
intrastate diasporas. At the same time, the parties soug ht to 
politicize the petty intelligentsia-whose most radicalized sector 
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had founded them - and sought to direct the cultural produc-
uon of exilic communities. 
In the early stages of this competition, the Church held 
an advantage which was made manifestly clear as late as 1878. 
After the Russo-Turkish Warofl877-1878, at a conference of the 
major European powers in Berlin, Armenian requests for Otto-
man reforms were on the agenda. The question of who could 
represent the Armenians was foregrounded because, in a sense. 
the Empire's much-abused Armenians were bringing suit against 
their sovereign in the Mcourt" of the conference. Though an 
efficient lay elite existed. with new powers granted in a 
Mconstitution" the Sultan gave the Armenian millet in 1863, it 
was soon apparent that the Patriarch, Khrimian. was the only 
figure acceptable to all as leader of the Armenian delegation . He 
went to Berlin and came back empty-handed, but he vindicated 
his mission in a way that still reverberates in Armenian discus -
sions of exile government. 
In a speech to his disappointed flock. he described the 
Berlin Conference in homely. familiar images as a feast at which 
hari,sa. an Armenian dish with the consistency of mashed 
potatoes. was seived: the other guests (nation-states with ar-
mies) came with "iron ladles" and seived themselves portions. 
Khrimian said, whereas he had been sent with only a "paper 
ladle" (promises of reform from the Sultan and European pow-
ers). This plain metaphor. elaborated in the rhetoric and political 
discourse of generations. still recurs in the rhetoric of Armenian 
exile today . What was for Khrimian a description of the limits of 
exile government became for the radicals a prescription. a call to 
arms. The persistence of the metaphor and its ability to structure 
debate as recently as the l 970's, during the renewal of Armenian 
terrorism, is astonishing••. 
The founders of the political parties soon had to face the 
urgent questions for which the "Iron Ladle" stood. The Armenian 
conseivatives. the Sultan. the Tzar and the European powers 
refused to recognize these parties as representatives of the 
Armenians . However, having failed to protect the peasants of the 
homeland from persecutions. which increased after 1878. the 
traditional elites were vulnerable to competition from the new 
parties . As the Hnchags and the Dashnags gained popularity 
among what they correctly described as the oppressed Armenian 
masses of the Ottoman and Tzarist empires. both responded with 
an escalation of violence which led to imperial use of massacre 
and pogrom as instruments of state policy. 
Of course, neither government allowed the Armenians a 
free press or elections that might confirm the loss of support for 
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the traditional Armenian leaders. Repression accelerated the 
development of underground party organizations in both em-
pires; these maintained close contact between the home terrtto-
ries, the intrastate diasporas and the overseas diasporas, espe-
cially after the massacres of 1894-1896. They fought first to 
defend the population, then to seek its autonomy; national 
liberation came late to their agendas. By 1908 the parties had a 
secret membership in the thousands and were supported by tens 
of thousands of non -combatants . The Dashnags had an under-
ground militia and the capacity to organize self-defense in 
certain mountainous areas, to carry out terrorism elsewhere, 
and to distribute forbidden newspapers printed overseas and 
brought in from Persia or Bulgaria. Its leadership planned and 
carried out actions from bases in Europe, the Russian Empire 
and Persia. Its most spectacular actions included the seizure of 
the Banque Ottomane in Istanbul, arguably the first act of 
terrorist occupation or "hijacking" in history, and the raid of 
Khanassor. Both were envisaged as specifically transnational 
acts: that is , they were meant to convince the transnational 
Armenian nation and the European powers that the Dashnag 
party was a government, functioning both from exile and at 
home, and that it had what others since David Beg had lacked: 
arms and men, the will to use them even if it usually meant 
losing, and a recognized role as a defender of the Armenian 
nation . 
The seizure of the Banque Ottomane ended in publicity, 
the deaths of most of the attackers and safe-conduct for those 
surviving the occupation. Khanassor, which took place on July 
24-26, 1897, was the more remarkable transnational event. It 
involved a battalion-size force armed with Russian, Turkish and 
German weapons, assembled and trained in Russian and Per-
sian territory, equipped with banners and a clear command 
structure that gave the temporary unit a military cast. Members 
of the unit came from the home territories and exile. They crossed 
the Russo-Persian border, raided and severely damaged the 
encampment of Kurds responsible for the massacre of 800 
Armenians. At the time, this event was celebrated by Armenians; 
over the years, it became a topic of song and story, an event 
etched in memory as proof that the nation had not only masters 
like the Tzar and the Sultan , but its own defenders and leaders 
in the Dashnag Party, which henceforth became the most 
persistent and success[ ul modem aspirant to governmental 
status at home and in exile••. 
The enduring significance of Khanassor is indicated by 
the fact that some Armenians tum to it as a paradigm even now. 
134 
Thus. an Editorial headlined (in Armenian) "We Need New 
J{hanassors" appeared (July 28, 1989) in the moderate weekly 
Hye Gyank("Armenian Life") of Los Angeles (circulation 10,000). 
Pointing to the killings of Soviet Armenian citizens in Soviet 
,Azerbaijan. which have remained unpunished and under-re-
ported, it states: 'We need new Khanassors to strike at and 
restrain the Azeris who threaten our compatriots." Running on 
the name of the Dashnag party. which means "harmonious 
federation," the editorial calls for the renewal of a federation of 
def enders. a role the government of the Armenian SSR, which 
has no army, does not fulfill:"We need those who would make 
new Khanassors," concludes the article - a new entity that can 
def end Armenians in and beyond the Soviet Union against Azeris 
and Turkey (cited elsewhere in the piece). Khanassor enabled a 
political party, operating in exile and the home territories both, 
to claim the most indispensable function of government. the 
right to make war in defense of the nation. Between 1897 and 
1908, the Dashnag underground Jedayees fought frequently 
against Kurds and Turks in the Ottoman Empire, and in 1905-
1907 in the Tzarist Empire, against the Azeris, in the course of 
events which there is no room to discuss here. 
In 1908, the Young Turk Junta seized power in the 
Ottoman state and took faltering steps to modernize its politics. 
The next six years were marked by the first democratic compe-
tition in the ranks of the Armenian elites. To counter the 
socialism of the Hnchags and Dashnags. the bourgeoisie formed 
the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan (Democratic-Constitutional) Party 
(1908), which was allied with the philanthropic Armenian Gen-
eral Benevolent Union (AGBU). founded in 1906: the fiscal 
resources of the latter remain the single largest economic force 
in ex:ilic public life (an endowment of$75 million in 1988). These 
groups, allied with the church, competed with the two more 
radical parties. By 1914, the Dashnags were the most important 
but not the dominant force in the transnational nation, manag-
ing its civic life in a loose and uneasy relationship with others, 
with room for discursive struggle. 
During the period 1908-1914, the traditional elites came 
into closer contact with their co-nationals across the Ottoman-
Tzarist boundary, leading to an alliance of major consequences, 
and created at the initiative of the Catholicos Kevork V. This 
cleric held a position that made his ancient predecessors head of 
the Armenian Church in the Armenian Kingdom: the prestige 
(but not always the actual power) of the position did and does 
overshadow that of any other Armenian cleric. To bolster it in the 
new transnational arena, the Catholicos allied himself with 
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Boghos Noubar Pasha, a founder of the AGBU, the leading 
conservative notable of his day and one of the two or three 
wealthiest Armenians in the world ; his family was of Ottoman 
Armenian descent and had managed the financial affairs of 
Egypt under the Khedives. Francophone and usually a resident 
of Parts, the Pasha was appointed the Catholicos· personal 
representative to the London conference on the Balkan Wars in 
1912. Armenians have often sought to send representatives to 
international conferences. In the absence of recognition by the 
great powers of a formal government-in -exile, other forms of 
sanctioned contact at the diplomatic level or between equivalent 
organizations have been a mode of self-legitimation for both the 
Armenians and others: the recognition of even a health organi-
zation that acts in the name of an exile community is considered 
(not always wrongly) a step towards the possibility of greater 
participation in the international arena, and it always legitimates 
the sponsors of the move in the community. The Pasha 's appoint-
ment. while of no immediate diplomatic consequence, was part 
of a campaign to regain ground for the old elite . 
The significance of this step became manifest after the 
First World War . Earlier, between 1911 and 1913, a troika had 
seized control of the "ItUhad ve Terakki" Party which ruled the 
Ottoman empire . As its war against Russia began to go badly in 
December, 1914, the Party used its total control of the apparatus 
of the mobilized state to launch the genocide of its Armenian 
subjects. Between 1915 and 1917 , some 1.5 million Armenians 
were killed and nearly half a million made refugees . By mid-191 7. 
military fortunes reversed as the Russians collapsed under the 
impact of their Revolution, and the resurgent Ottoman armies 
came close to conquering the portion of the Armenian homeland 
that had hitherto been under Russian protection; the genocide 
threatened to become total. 
In a moment of unrivalled crisis, Armenians turned to the 
AzkayinKhorhourt. literally the National Council, which already 
existed, but whose task it now became to coordinate the efforts 
of all surviving Armenians, whatever their class or faction. It ls 
indicative of the importance of the intrastate diaspora that this 
government of exiles met in Tbilisi, then the administrative 
center of the Transcaucasus. It mobilized funds, medicine and 
supplies and kept thousands alive in the chaos of 1917-1918; 
but the most visible "savior" of the population was a ragtag army 
- consisting of Armenians trained in the Tzartst army and of the 
underground militia of the Dashnags - that held the Ottoman 
forces at bay after the Tzartst army dissolved . When the sovereign 
Armenian state was founded on May 28, 1918 , Aram Manoogian. 
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a Dashnag leader, was given (provisional) dictatorial powers. and 
when free Parliamentary elections were held in 1919, the Dash-
nags won an overwhelming victory among the one million surviv-
ing _Am1enians who lived in the new republic. 
However, many Annenians lived in various forms of exile 
_ some as survivors in refugee camps, others safe in Paris or 
Moscow. Boston or Cairo. While they also celebrated the new 
state. they def erred to the conservative bourgeoisie whose wealth 
and political ambitions were intact, and who were reluctant to 
acknowledge the militant intellectuals and peasant soldiers of 
the Dashnag party as the legitimate leaders of the nation. Their 
hopes for contesting the issue crystallized around Boghos Nou-
bar Pasha. 
Several factors were at work: first, the Dashnags had 
been a party of exile, but. having come to power in a nation-state, 
seemed prepared to claim priority for it and themselves in all 
political matters. Yet the bourgeoisie of the diaspora knew that 
its wealth and contacts with European leaders were indispen-
sable . The old "DelegationM to London, which in 1912 had 
consisted of the Pasha and his entourage, became the frame for 
a loose coalition to contest the claims of the Dashnag government 
of the new Republic to sole leadership, while managing not to 
seem to threaten the fragile state itself 1•. It was a delicate task. 
all the more so because as the peace conferences which were to 
arrange the map of postwar Europe became urgent realities in 
1919, a question was posed that characterizes the exilic nature 
of Armenian political life to the fullest: would the nation be 
represented solely by those who legitimately ruled the new 
nation-state, or would it also be represented by leaders of the 
still-exile sector of the nation, whose legitimacy was due not to 
election but to tradition and the fact that they performed services 
carried out by government functionaries in other polities? The 
question is familiar to experts on the relations between the 
Jewish Diaspora and Israel. It is also a question likely to emerge 
in the event of Palestinian nationhood. since at this point there 
are around two million Palestinians in the old home territories 
and nearly three million in diaspora. 
The Annenian solution was a damaging compromise. The 
contestants needed each other. The bourgeois elite could not 
openly challenge the leaders of the longed-for state, whose 
existence was joyfully celebrated by its constituency, whether in 
salons or survivors' camps. In turn, the Dashnags were a party 
in control of a government that had to have help from those 
leaders who remained relatively wealthy in the overseas diaspora 
or the Transcaucasus. These leaders were allied with their fellow 
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upper bourgeoisie in the "West," in Cairo and Parts - with the 
followers of the Pasha. The extraordinary compromise forged by 
the mediation of the Khorhourt was to go to the conferences of 
Versailles and Sevres (1919-1920) with two delegations, a MNa-
tlonal" delegation headed by the Pasha and the Republic's 
delegation. many of whose members were revolutionary intellec-
tuals led by Avetis Aharonian, a writer not necessarily suited to 
diplomacy but a "cultural producer" whose immensely popular, 
politicized stories had mobilized the Dashnags· mass following 
for two decades 17• 
There is no scholarly work in any language that fully 
assesses the impact of this double presence of the Republic and 
exile governments at the peace conferences 1•. Some of the 
correspondence of the Republic's Dashnag leaders has been 
published, and their assessment is more negative than their 
public stance at the time, which amounted to saying that the 
prevailing cooperative spirit transcended the tensions. The dis-
senting private assessments .. point to the fact that Western, 
especially British diplomats preferred to discuss matters With 
the urbane and wealthy Pasha than With a poorly funded radical 
like Aharonian. There is evidence that the Pasha negotiated with 
Kurdish and French representatives Without consulting With 
Aharonian; representing the survivors of Ottoman Armenians, 
his delegation had somewhat different territorial ambitions. 
Beyond that, it is difficult to assess the specifically diasporan 
interests which it sought to promote. Was there a specifically 
exile view of what the new Armenian Republic should be? The 
question may not have seemed urgent when the U.S. recognized 
the Republic (April, 1920) and others followed suit (France, 
Britain, Japan, Italy, Brazil, Belgium, Persia, Georgia, Azer-
baijan). and promises were made to the Armenian victims of 
Ottoman Turkey. But by the summer of 1919 Mustapha Kemal 
(Ataturk) had launched the struggle which. coupled With the rise 
of the Soviet State. would catch the new republic in a pincer and 
eliminate it before all but the most modest hopes of the Armeni-
ans were realized. 
The existence of two delegations in Parts was to prove 
prophetic of the future divisions of post-genocide exile. On 
December 2, 1920, the Dashnag government of the Armenian 
Republic surrendered to the Red Army, on generous conditions 
which were immediately violated as the nascent secret police 
began to arrest and execute Dashnag leaders. On February 18, 
1921, a Dashnag-organtzed revolt sought to overthrow the 
Communists; a doomed struggle continued until July 1921. after 
which the surviving members of the Dashnag government fled to 
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France, where they Joined the members of the Republic's delega-
uon to the 1919-1920 peace conferences . 
Government-in-Exile and After: The Contemporary Moment 
By 1921, the population distribution of the Armenian 
nation had changed radically. Three fourths of the world's 
surviving Armenians lived in the USSR: just over a million in the 
Armenian SSR and half a million as an intrastate diaspora . In 
Ataturk's new Turkey, 125,000 Armenians were left, cowed and 
no longer permitted to take part in any non-religious activity. 
(Today only 55,000 are left.) Around half a million Armenians 
lived in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Greece, France and the 
U.S.A. later also in Australia, Canada and Argentina. The 
problems facing the exile leadership were both massive and new: 
who would lead? to what purpose, given that the larger propor-
tion of the homeland was denuded of Armenians and incorpo-
rated into the territory of the Turkish Republic, with the assent 
of the Western signatories totheTreatyofLausanne (1923), while 
the rest was part of the USSR? 
In 1921, the government-in-exile was acknowledged by 
one country. France. The lack of a more general recognition was 
not itself an insurmountable problem: other exile governments 
suivive thanks to the patronage of one major state. France's 
position owed much to the fact that Armenian refugees who were 
former citizens of the defunct Ottoman and Tzarist empires had 
neither documentation nor citizenship. The government-in-exile 
issued identity-cards to Armenian refugees. which also func-
tioned as passports across European boundaries. That was the 
primary service they extended to their impoverished co-nationals 
until early 1924, when France recognized the Turkish Republi-
cand the USSR In the immediate postwar Diaspora, the govern-
ment-in -exile was wholly dependent on the Dash nags: most of its 
members had been party members all along, and with the fall of 
the Republic they reverted to it. Among Armenian supporters, 
they were revered as reminders of past hopes. Bearing the name 
WBadvtragootyun" (Delegation). the shell of the government-in-
exile was maintained, in a Paris building and museum, until 
1939. then again from 1945 to 1965, when even the pretence 
lapsed. 
However, as this essay has argued throughout, the 
Armenian diaspora had long been organized and governed by 
elites who performed services and had access to human, ideologi-
cal and fiscal resources. While these resources were a pale 
shadow of their prewar selves, there were enough militants and 
embittered sympathizers among the survivors to reconstitute the 
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old organizations, which debated and continue to debate ques-
tions concerning exile government. 
Among the issues that have remained important to this 
day is the role of the Annenian Soviet Socialist Republic 1n the 
diaspora . After 1921 it was clear that the final arbiter of the SSR's 
affairs was the Kremlin: the SSR was powerless to defend 
Annenians in the Soviet intrastate diaspora (e.g. Karabagh was 
attached to the Turkic Azerbaijani SSR. thus laying the founda-
tions for renewed conflict during Gorbachev's reign). On the 
other hand, the SSR was the only intact part of the homeland, 
and an Annenian Communist Party ruled it as the Kremlin's 
satrap. What was to be its role vis a vis the exile leadership in 
largely capitalist countries? The question. debated by exiles 
since 1923, has been whether they should seek to be Uunior) 
allies of the SSR. hence of the USSR. or independent actors. 
Because of anti-Bolshevism and the Cold War , the former 
position has long been a difficult one to maintain, yet tenable 1n 
so far as the segment of the exile elite which took it supervised 
the "traffic" of people and cultural groups to and from Soviet 
Annenia. Ironically, driven by anxiety about Dashnag legitimacy 
as the heir of the Republic and by the possible claim that realism 
meant accepting the primacy of the SSR. the Annenian 
bourgeoisie 's elites (AGBU. ADL, the clergy obedient to the 
Catholicos in Annenia) became the allies of the SSR. The 
Dashnag Party took the position that the diaspora must main-
tain an independent government of exile, with the hope of 
eventually returning to power in Annenia . This party. though 
more radical than those of the upper bourgoise , received U.S. 
support during the Cold War. 
Other issues that have mattered to the debates of the 
exiles include the provision of sexvices: the question of what to 
do, in the aftermath of Genocide, given that the new Turkish 
Republic not only absolved itself of any responsibility for the 
genocide its predecessor state had perpetrated but also denied 
the event had happened: what territorial claims. if any, a 
government of exile could sustain in a world of nation-states. 
where neither the League of Nations nor the U.N. Charter make 
provision for the pursuit of such claims; and what, if anything, 
can be done to stem the rising assimilation of Annenians in the 
Western diaspora. 
The question of services has been differently addressed 
across the diaspora . In the Middle East. before nationalism and 
oil money altered the situation in the l 960's, governments were 
unable or unwilling to provide services toAnnenian refugees and 
their descendants . Here, funds raised in the Armenian-American 
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diaspora played a key role, which meant that theAGBU andADL 
eUtes. with better access to such funds. gained a greater legiti-
macy from administering aid than the relatively poorer Dash-
nags. But both used their fiscal resources skillfully. The immis-
erated refugees had been reasonably well educated in the schools 
of the prewar Armenian system of intrastate exile: Arab govern-
ments and their colonial masters (British and French) welcomed 
the .Armenians' ability to care for themselves. The result in 
Lebanon (where the confessional state has always been weak) 
was the creation of Armenian enclaves with Armenian mayors in 
which the principal language of daily life is Armenian, where 
separate hospitals and old-age homes exist. as does an Armenian 
college: there are designated Armenian seats in Parliament. for 
which the Dashnags fight and usually win electoral battles 
agatnst other factions. Finally, in Lebanon the Dashnag and 
Hnchag parties have militias. The Armenian Middle East has its 
own Catholicos, inferior in status but not in influence to the one 
1n the USSR, and a strong Armenian intelligentzia and press. in 
which debate is fierce. While the Lebanese civil war (after 1975) 
and the Iranian revolution (after 1979) have left these communi-
ties a pale shadow of their former selves, its emigrants have 
moved West (some 150,000 to Los Angeles) and brought much of 
their vigor with them. Between 1975 and 1983. a few such 
Armenians in Beirut launched a new episode of transnational 
terrorism. 
That terrorism resulted from the breakdown of the con-
sensus prevailing among the elites of the government of exile. 
and especially the Dashnags. since the last outburst of Armenian 
terrorism. between 1919 and 1923. The earlier episode. though 
murky , is linked to the later. In 1919, the Dashnag Party set up 
a special revenge unit. Nemesis. whose existence was deniable by 
both the Party and the government of the Republic. Over three 
years, the unit assassinated some of the top executives of the 
~Ittihad" Party responsible for the genocide• 0 • In 1922-1923, in a 
still partially-secret debate at a Party Congress, Dashnag offi-
cials debated whether to continue armed struggle against Turkey 
by carrying out terrorism and minor guerrilla raids. and whether 
the Party had a task appropriate to the new conditions. One 
official, H. Kachaznuni, argued that "The Dashnagtzootyun No 
Longer Has Anything To Do," that the party should dissolve itself 
and let a new diasporan agenda and party emerge. (True to his 
opinions. he resigned and returned to Soviet Armenia). The 
Dashnags chose to go on. but armed struggle was abandoned. In 
1931-1934. a group of cadres. including some of the most 
promising, were expelled because they demanded a return to at 
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least occasional terrorism as a symbol substantiating the exile 
government's claims that the genocide was still an issue. that 
Armenian territories would be reclaimed some day. and that the 
exiles still had armed force (however puny). an essential feature 
of government. along with Mmartyrs" ready to fight in its name••. 
When the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union. two fonner 
commanders of the prewar militias sought Dashnag sponsored 
Armenian units to fight Stalin and Mliberate" Armenia. They 
failed. but kept alive the question of when exiles should fight, 
against whom. and under what aegis . During the first Lebanese 
civil war ( 1958). Dashnag and Hnchag militias fought each other 
in a minuscule Armenian civil war embedded within the larger 
conflict for control of the machinery and substantial income of 
the exile government in Lebanon . This fratricidal conflict under-
scores the importance of exile government to daily life in the 
Armenian diaspora . 
Memories of these conflicts were fresh between 1965 and 
1975, the decade of the incubation of terrorism in articles and 
meetings; unaffiliated youth as well as cadres of the Hnchag and 
especially Dashnag parties. influenced by the PLO, disturbed by 
the erasure of the Genocide from Western historiography, the ex-
clusion of Armenian demands from international agendas, anci 
by the quietism of elites, debated armed struggle . An under-
ground faction, ASAI.A, launched Armenian terrorism in 1975 
and was Joined by other groups. Before it stopped in 1983-1985, 
ASAI.A terrorists had assassinated half a dozen Dashnag leaders 
of the exile government. as well as Turkish diplomats and others 
in Western Europe and North America" . In the 1970's. attempts 
to create a new pan-Armenian organization. non-violent but sup-
portive of some ASAI.A demands. led to the short-lived Armenian 
World Congress . Rejecting all these groups but riding a renewal 
of diasporan commitment. new organizations have explored al-
ternative paths. One example is the Solidarite Franco-Arrne-
nienne. which successfully lobbied the European Parliament to 
issue the Strasbourg Resolution of June 18, 1987: in response 
to Turkish abuses of Armenians, Kurds and Cypriot Greeks. the 
Parliament demanded reforms as a precondition of Turkey's 
admission to the Common Market. A transnational community 
dealt with a supranational agency to influence a sovereign 
nation, in a move which may prefigure one future direction of 
action by the Armenian government of exile. 
Elsewhere, competition in the exile elite has been at the 
level of community development and patronage of cultural 
production . Armenians living in France or the U.S .A.. for ex-
ample. do not require the level of services needed in parts of the 
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Middle East. but the construction of specifically Annenian day 
schools (there are 20 in the U.S. A) . churches ( 107). newspapers 
and other communal facilities demands the raising and expen-
diture of tens of millions of dollars every year and employs 
hundreds. Millions are also raised and channeled to needy 
Arlllenians overseas. as for example after the December 1988 
earthquake to Soviet Annenia. Such activity is accompanied by 
discursive war within what some community leaders now pref er 
to call the leadership of the ethnic community, rather than the 
exile government of a diaspora, though there remains consider-
able overlap between the two concepts. All but two leading 
.Armenian organizations in the U.S.A. are still transnational and 
have to deal with tensions between their ethnic and diasporan 
inclinations. Of the exceptions, one. the Annenian Assembly, is 
organized as a Washington lobbying effort, but a vacuum of 
leadership elsewhere is increasingly causing it to become the 
leading organization of Annenians in Amelica. The other. the 
Zoryan Institute, is an innovative think-tank which consults 
with diasporan and Soviet Annenian analysts of the Armenian 
condition. shaping a new pan-Annenlan discourse while retain-
ing its American base. 
The transnational nation is on the verge of another 
political transformation, due to Gorbachev's reforms, the Kara-
bagh issue and the attacks upon Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan 
(over 100 have been killed and 200,000 have fled or have been 
deported) 23 , the earthquake and, above all. the popular reform 
movement in Armenia. These events evoke the genocide, the 
earthquake does so because of its unusual destructiveness, the 
Karabagh crtsis because Azelis are attempting to expel Armeni-
ans from the last fragment of historical Armenia outside the SSR 
still inhabited by a majority Annenian population. Lost people 
and lost lands evoke loss, the central experience of exiles. The 
feeling has mobilized the diaspora. and the easing of constraints 
on contacts between Soviet Armenian and exile leaders makes 
transnational action more likely. 
It is now easier for the exile government to deal with and 
perhaps to influence Soviet Armenian leaders than it has ever 
been. Of course. the reverse is theoretically also true, but in fact 
the delegitimation ofall things Soviet is so complete that the exile 
government is more confident of itself than it has been for 
decades. The ADL faction, which for too long served as the SSR's 
junior partner, is discredited; the Armenian Assembly is courted 
by Soviet Armenia for its access to U.S.-Armenian capital and to 
Congress. and as a result is growing in influence and prestige in 
the diaspora. The Dashnags. in particular. are bolstered by the 
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fact that the outlawed flag of the Republic they governed is again 
the flag of the Armenian SSR. Dashnag heroes are rehabilitated, 
and demonstrators have called for its legalization as an opposi-
tion party inside the Armenian SSR The elites of the extle 
government matter more than before, and different elites matter 
differently. The age-old dream of a pan-Armenian polity jointly 
led by consulting and cooperating elites at home and in diaspora 
is once again a beckoning temptation. Without a nation-state to 
call their own, the Armenians still seek their transnational 
nation. The enduring shape of the Armenian polity provides a 
model for those collectivities which for the foreseeable future Will 
ex1st in the global system as nations with a small home territory 
and a large overseas population led by an "exileM or diasporan 
elite. 
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2 o'fhere is no foreign-language study of this movement. 
but the French journalist Jacques Derogie based a well -re -
searched political thriller on the events: Operation Nemesis 
(Paris: Fayard), 1986. 
21 See this author's "Martyrdom as Legitimacy/ Contem -
porary Research on Terrorism, eds. P. Wilkinson and A. Stewart 
(Aberdeen : Aberdeen U.P., 1987). pp. 89-103 . 
2 21\vo books and several articles off er an overview of this 
phase of Armenian terrorism. However. they discuss interna-
tional issues. not the intranational context - struggle over exile 
government - which made terrorism seem an option. See 
Michael Gunther (Pursuing the Just Cause ojTheir People. West-
port, CT: Greenwood Press. 1986) and Anat Kurtz and Ariel 
Merari. ASAIA, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 
1986. and their review by this author in Conflict Quarterly 
(Summer 1988). pp . 101-105 . 
23The under-reporting of these events in the US press is 
one more indication of Amertcan unwillingness to do anything 
that might make Gorbachev's position seem less secure . It is a 
measure of local anarchy that the Soviet authorities allow 
disputes between the republics to be solved by small massacres 
of Armenians and by mass deportations (fearing reprisal, 170,000 
Azerts have left the ASSR). For a rare, albeit passing, mention of 
the killings see: Rasma Karklins. "Perestroika and Ethnopolitics 
in the USSR". PS: Political Science and Politics, 21 :2 (June 1989). 
p. 213 . 
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